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Abstract - The Smart meters are used in the areas of generation, transmission, distribution and consumption. The
capabilities of smart meter systems and grid networks, such as distributed intelligence and broadband capabilities can greatly
enhance efficiency and reliability, but they may also create much new vulnerability if not deployed with the appropriate
security controls. Much of the technology currently in use by the meters are outdated and in many cases unreliable. A system
architecture implementing should recognize security threats and capture events that result not from external threats but from
internal mistakes, with human error being a more common occurrence. An effective security approach enhances reliability
because some security failures might be people failures, while others might be equipment failures, might be due to natural
causes or might be deliberate. A simple perimeter defense is not sufficient; monitoring, both for events and physical actions,
is required to bring the benefits of smart meters with minimal risk to this vital part of the infrastructure of modern life.
Keywords-DLMS/COSEM, SmartMeters, Application Association (AA),GPRS, GEA, Signaling System 7 (SS7), TMSI, IMSI.

I.

A. DLMS Based Smart Meter Overview
The liberalized energy market requirements
given by DLMS meters are;
 Unbundling of monopolistic utilities.
 Introduction of competition in all activities: –
generation – transport – supply – customer
management -meter operation –meter reading –
meter data management.
 Geographical dispersion, volatile customer base.
 Multi-energy - multi-user - multi-vendor
environment.
 Need selective and secure access to data and
interoperability.

INTRODUCTION

DLMS/COSEM specification specifies a data
model and communication protocols for data
exchange with metering equipment. It follows a
three-step approach:
 Step 1. Modelling: This covers the data model of
metering equipment as well as rules for data
identification. The data model provides a view of
the functionality of the meter, as it is available at
its interface(s). It uses generic building blocks to
model this functionality. The model does not
cover internal, implementation-specific issues.
 Step 2, Messaging: This covers the
communication services and protocols for
mapping the elements of the data model to
application protocol data units (APDU).
 Step 3, Transporting: This covers the services
and protocols for the transportation of the
messages through the communication channel.

Fig.2 DLMS meter

B. Why DLMS
DLMS is comparable to a set of rules or a
common language, on which the various operators
have agreed. The DLMS-protocol enables the
integration of energy meters with data management
systems from other manufacturers. This secures that
the energy supplier gets the full advantage of the
meter functions. The utility that has invested in a
smart metering solution pulls an enormous amount of

Fig.1 The three steps approach of DLMS Modelling –
Messaging – Transporting
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information out of the meters ie;information that can
be used for a lot more than billing purposes such as:
 Load control
 Development of tariff models for special
customer segments
DLMS-protocol enables Energy trade and has Low
communication overhead. When using it only
necessary data reaches utility software.
II.



Utility Settings association (US)

C. No authentication security
This level provides access to the server without
any authentication during sign on the access to the
server is read only for PC association.
D. Low-Level Security
Low level authentication security offers adequate
security to avoid eavesdropping and message
(password) replay during data transfer. This level of
security is mandatory in MR association which will
have a password for data download. The association
objects provide an attribute called ‘LLS_secret’ to
change the secret (low level security password) only
by the authorized client.
Verification of Low-Level Security: Client transmits
a ‘secret’ to the server, by using the ‘Calling
Authentication Value’ parameter of the COSEMOPEN. Request service primitive of the client
application layer.The server verifies the received
‘secret’ with the corresponding client identification
and the association is established, if the received
‘secret’ is valid.
E. High Level Security
High-level authentication security is typically
used when the communication channel offers
extrinsic security and suitable measures to be taken to
avoid eavesdroppers and message (password) replay.
This level of security is mandatory for the US mode
of association. HLS mechanism defines a 4-pass signon scheme where the client and server exchange
challenges and then reply to the challenges with a
processed response. The processing performed on the
challenges is an encryption using a secret key.
Pass1: The client transmits ‘challenge’ to the server
(CtoS).
Pass2: The server transmits ‘challenge (as
acknowledgement)’ to the client (StoC).
Once the Pass 2 is also valid, the association is
formally established between the client and the server
but the access of the client is restricted to the method
"reply to HLS authentication” of the current
"association" object.
Pass3: The client processes StoCin a secret way. The
result of (StoC) is sent back to the server. The server
checks the result of correct processing and if correct
the server accepts the authentication of the client.
Pass4: If the client is authenticated, the server
processes (CtoS) in a secret way. The result of (CtoS)
is sent back to the client. The client checks the result
of the correct processing and if correct, the client
accepts the authentication of the server.
Pass3 and Pass4 are supported by the
method”reply_toHLS_authentication”of
the
association object(s). If both passes are successfully
executed, then full access is granted according to the
current association. Otherwise, either the client or the
server aborts the association. Inaddition; the
association object provides the method to change the
HLS ‘secret’ (e.g. the encryption key):

DATA ACCESS SECURITY IN DLMS
METER

Data access security concerns role based access
to data in a DLMS/COSEM device. It is managed by
the Association LN / Association SN objects. Each
COSEM server i.e., a logical device may support
AAs with various clients, each having a different role,
and with this, different access rights. Each AA is
identified with a pair of lower layer addresses. Each
Association object provides a list of objects visible in
that particular AA and the access rights to their
attributes and methods. To be able to access data, the
client must be properly authenticated. Upon AA
establishment, an authentication context is negotiated
between the client and the server. This specifies the
required authentication of the peers, and, where
needed, the security algorithm to verify the
authentication.
A. Authentication In Data Exchange
The
security
of
exchanges
includes
authentication of the Client and the Server,
confidentiality of exchanged datacontrol of access to
the variable objects of the Server. Authentication
enables the Server to control the identity of the Client
in order to provide with proper access rights. When
this authentication is mutual, the Client can also
control the Server. The data confidentiality is taken
care for authorized readings only and data exchange
is protected. Masking options of the message and
time provides additional and adequate security.
The standard supports two security schemes that are
defined in ICS:
 Basic security
 Advanced security.
B. Basic security (Authentication)
Basic security is an access control which
provides authentication as addressed in COSEM
specification. In order to provide different levels of
security for authentication support, COSEM specifies
three levels of authentication securities:
 No authentication (lowest level) security.
 Low level, password based authentication
security (LLS) identifying only the client.
 High-level, four-pass authentication security
(HLS) identifying both the client and the server.
The meter supports three associations in the
Management Logical Device:
 Public Client association (PC)
 Meter Reader association (MR)
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change_HLS_secret.
F. Advanced Security (Data Security)
Transport of data is done in secret way e.g. the
encryption key. Encryption is the conversion of data
into a form, called a cipher text. Chipper text cannot
be easily understood by unauthorized client. It is
mostly used for data security purpose. The proposed
standard for encryption is AES GCM for ICS.

The protocol used for communication between
the master (smart) meter andthe slave meter is usually
considered of lesser importance as its impact
isrestricted to the single customer household.
Although this is generally correct,from a risk
management point of view it is important to identify
and address asituation where a cheap "man in the
middle" device is inserted between themaster and
slave meters which lowers the usage reading by a
constantdivision.
This manipulation is both very hard for the utility
to identify and canhappen in a large scale if a
criminal party decides to mass produce andmarket
these devices – much like pirate cable set-top boxes /
satellitedecoders.
E. Slave Meter Unauthorized Disconnection
Some slave meters support disconnection of the
customer upon receiving arequest from the master
meter. Normally the associated risk is minimal as ifan
attacker was to disconnect the slave meter, as these
meters are commonlyconnected by wire to the master
meter the physical presence is required andtherefore
disconnection could be achieved by bringing a
hammer. Thisassumption causes to set low security
settings to this communication channel,as it is
perceived as non-critical. Unfortunately, some of the
meteringprotocols used between meters are wireless
(e.g. WMBUS, Z-Wave) making itpossible for an
attacker with a potent transmitter to send a disconnect
signalto multiple customers, especially in crowded
urban areas. The attacker will notneed receive the
data back from the meters to issue this command.
F. Insecure Protocol Implementation
Meters from a variety of vendors that were
audited by Security [6] were foundto improperly
handle malformed requests. When a meter firmware
makescertain assumptions regarding the data it
receives, and in particular themaximum size of each
message type, it may be vulnerable to a very wellknown
attack
condition
named
Buffer
Overrun/Overflow Vulnerability. Thisvulnerability
may allow the attacker to cause system instability or
freeze,change values of parameters which are saved
in the memory stack or evenexecute arbitrary code. In
most of the meters and RTUs that were audited byour
"red team", such a condition was identified and
exploited.
G. Firmware Upgrade Vulnerabilities
Firmware upgrades are a double edged sword.
The existence of the capabilityto remotely upgrade
the meter firmware is of crucial importance – as
securityexperts like to repeat a well-known, and true,
mantra that "what is consideredsecure today may be
proven otherwise tomorrow". There's no assurance
thata new unforeseen attack will successfully
compromise a meter model and soin order to be able
to respond the operator must have the ability to
securelyupdate the meter firmware to upgrade as
many meters as it can before theyare
compromised.The other side of firmware upgrades is

III.GRID NETWORK VULNERABILITIES
The listed vulnerabilities are not necessarily
ordered according to severity, which is affected by
the particular utility type, infrastructure, potential
attacker profile and many other factors that need to be
determined in the general risk assessment process.
A. Network Management from Remote Nodes
Each meter is a node in the Smart Grid network.
Although the processesbeing executed on the network
require only data to be read and commands tobe sent
to the meter, the management applications and
services remainexposed and available for all the
nodes.The practical implications of this scenario is
that without explicit constraints,an attacker who uses
the communication module of the smart meter
cancause network-wide changes, ranging from
disrupting the communication flowto rerouting all the
traffic to his node for later manipulation.
B. Lack of Authentication
Security [6] has encountered numerous meters
that didn't have anyauthentication or encryption
support. This design flaw makes it possible for
anattacker to impersonate the control center and send
unauthorized commandsto meters or read metering
data. The consequence of a successful attack
onmeters with disconnection capabilities is
particularly destructive. It should be noted that
although some of the metering protocols
supportencryption, which can be viewed as a network
access password, most of thedeployments we've
encountered so far did not enable these features.
Sinceevery metering standard includes support for
"no encryption" or "noauthentication", it usually
poses too great a temptation for the integrationteams
which prefer to choose these settings in order to avoid
additionaldeployment problems.
C. Authentication Bypass
Several metering protocols (DLMS, IEC 608705-102) implementation havefunctions to read
metering data which do not require a password,
andconfiguration/disconnect functions that require the
operator password. Twometers that we audited
retrieved the password for the restricted
functionsusing the unprotected read function. This
implementation makes theauthentication/password
protection completely useless.

D. Slave Meter Data Tampering
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that they serve as a powerful tool forattackers, if they
can be abused. For example, an attacker who can
push hisown firmware to other meters can execute a
disconnect action and then makethe meter completely
unresponsive till it is returned to the manufacturer,
thusmaking it impossible for the network operator to
reverse his actions.To conclude, it is crucial to have a
remote firmware upgrade capability, butone that was
designed with security in mind and audited
thoroughly byexperts.
H. Input Validation
The all-too-familiar security problem of input
validation, which is unfortunatelyquite common in
control systems, was found to exist in Smart Grid
meters andservers as well. Should an attacker be able
to broadcast malformedmessages to a node on the
Smart Grid (which we elaborated on why that
cannormally easily be done) it will have a relatively
high success probability tocause the node to fail. The
failure is a result of assuming that the datareceived is
in the expected message format, whereas when a
malformedpacket is parsed it causes an exception that
may even lead to arbitrary codeexecution.

TMSI corruption or database failure, the SGSN
should request the MS to identify itself bymeans of
IMSI on the radio path. Furthermore, when theuser
roams and the new serving network cannot contactthe
previous (the old serving network) or cannot
retrievethe user identity, then, the new serving
network shouldalso request the MS to identify itself
by means of IMSIon the radio path. This fact may
lead an active attackerto pretend to be a new serving
network, to which theuser has to reveal his permanent
identity. In addition, inboth cases the IMSI that
represents the permanent useridentity isconveyed in
clear-text over the radio interfaceviolating user
identity confidentiality.
B. Subscriber Identity Authentication
A mobile user that attempts to access the
network mustfirst prove his identity to it. User
authentication protects against fraudulent use and
ensures correct billing.GPRS uses the authentication
procedure already definedin GSM with the same
algorithms for authentication andgeneration of
encryption key, and the same secret key, Ki.
However, from the network side, the wholeprocedure
is executed by the SGSN (instead of the basestation)
and employs a different random number (GPRSRAND), and, thus, it produces a different signed
response(GPRS-SRES) and encryption key (GPRSKc) than theGSM voice counterpart.
The authentication mechanism used in GPRS
also exhibits some weak points regarding security.
More specifically, the authentication procedure is
one-way, and, thus, it does not assure that a mobile
user is connected to anauthentic serving network.
This fact enables active attacks using a false base
station identity. An adversary, who has the required
equipment, may masquerade as alegitimate network
element mediating in the communication between the
MS and the authentic base station. Thisis also
facilitated by the absence of a data integrity
mechanism on the radio access network of GPRS,
which defeats certain network impersonation attacks.
The resultsof this mediation may be the alternation or
the interception of signaling information and
communication dataexchanged.
C. Data and Signaling Protection
User data and signaling protection over the
GPRS radioaccess network is based on the GPRS
ciphering algorithm (GPRS-A5), which is also
referred to as GPRS Encryption Algorithm (GEA)
and is similar to the GSMA5. Currently, there are
three versions of this algorithm: GEA1, GEA2 and
GEA3 (that is actually A5/3), whichare not publicly
known, and, thus, it is difficult to performattacks on
them. The MS device (not the SIM-card) performs
GEA using the encryption key (GPRS-Kc), since itis
a strong algorithm that requires relatively high
processing capabilities. From the network side, the
serving SGSNperforms the ciphering/deciphering
functionality protecting signaling and user data over
the Um, Abis, and Gbinterfaces.

IV.GPRS SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
In order to meet security objectives, GPRS
employs a setof security mechanisms that constitutes
the GPRS security architecture. Most of these
mechanisms have beenoriginally designed for GSM,
but they have been modified to adapt to the packetoriented traffic nature and theGPRS network
components. The GPRS security architecture, mainly,
aims at two goals: a) to protect the networkagainst
unauthorized access, and b) to protect the privacyof
users. It includes the following components:
 Subscriber Identity Module (SIM)
 Subscriber identity confidentiality
 Subscriber identity authentication
 User data and signaling confidentiality between
the MS and the SGSN
 GPRS backbone security
A. Subscriber Identity Module – SIM
The subscription of a mobile user to a network is
personalized through the use of a smart card named
SubscriberIdentity Module (SIM). Each SIM-card is
unique andrelated to a user. It has a microcomputer
with a processor, ROM, persistent EPROM memory,
volatile RAM and an I/O interface. Its software
consists of an operatingsystem, file system, and
application programs (e.g., SIMApplication Toolkit).
The SIM card is responsible for the authentication of
the user by prompting for a code (Personal Identity
Number PIN).
A serious weakness of the GPRS security
architecture isrelated to the compromise of the
confidentiality of subscriber identity. Specifically,
whenever the serving network (VLR or SGSN)
cannot associate the TMSI withthe IMSI, because of
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An important weakness of the GPRS security
architectureis related to the fact that the encryption of
signaling anduser data over the highly exposed radio
interface is notmandatory. Some GPRS operators, in
certain countries,are never switch on encryption in
their networks, sincethe legal frameworks in these
countries do not permit that. Hence, in these cases
signaling and data traffic are conveyed in clear-text
over the radio path. This situation isbecoming even
more risky from the fact that the involvedend-users
(humans) are not informed whether their sessions are
encrypted or not.
D. GPRS Backbone Security
The GPRS backbone network includes the fixed
networkelements and their physical connections that
convey userdata and signaling information. Signaling
exchange inGPRS is mainly based on the Signaling
System 7 (SS7)technology, which does not support
any security measure for the GPRS deployment.
Similarly, the GTP protocol that is employed for
communication between GSNsdoes not support
security. Thus, user data and signalinginformation in
the GPRS backbone network are conveyedin cleartext exposing them to various security threats.In
addition, inter-network communications (between
different operators) are based on the public Internet,
whichenables IP spoofing to any malicious third party
who getsaccess to it. In the sequel, the security
measures appliedto the GPRS backbone network are
presented.
Based on the analysis of the GPRS security
architectureit can be perceived that the GPRS
securitydoes not aim at the GPRS backbone and the
wire-lineconnections, but merely at the radio access
network andthe wireless path. Thus, user data and
signaling information, conveyed over the GPRS
backbone, may experience security threats, which
degrade the level of securitysupported by GPRS. In
the following, the security weaknesses of the GPRS
security architecture that are relatedto the GPRS
backbone network for both signaling anddata plane
are presented and analyzed.

time from anywhere. The maturity of security in the
air interface and the low bandwidth available limits
the effectiveness of the Network Station as the source
of attacks. With the increase in the use of wireless
media, security problems of confidentiality, integrity,
and authentication are also increasing. The weak
points of the GPRS security architecturemay lead to
compromises of end-users and network security of
the GPRS system. The proposed enhancements can
be easily integrated in the existing GPRS
infrastructure, minimizing the required changes.
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